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NOTE
USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY TYPE OF CASE
Rule 56 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure introduces
the summary judgment to the courts of the State of Minnesota.
Since Rule 56 is an exact counterpart of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this procedural device will not be unfamiliar to those
Minnesota lawyers who frequently appear in federal court. Prior
to its adoption in the Federal Rules, the summary judgment in
varying forms had been adopted in several jurisdictions, including
New York, Michigan, Connecticut and the District of Columbia.,
Before that it was tried in England in 1855 but was limited to suits
on promissory notes. - Adoption of the Field Code halted the use of
1. See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L. J. 423,
440, 445, 456, 457 (1929).
2. 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (1855).
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a form of summary judgment that had been used in South Carolina
since 1773 and in Kentucky since 1805. 3 Virginia has continuously
used a form of the device since 1849.4 As a result there is an abundant source of commentary and precedent, particularly in respect
to the Federal Rules.5
Generally, the summary judgment offers no serious problems.
It may be initiated by the motion of either the plaintiff or defendant,
or both,6 and judgment may be granted to the party opposing the
7
motion though he himself has not moved for summary judgment.
It may be used to partially adjudicate the issues in any case,$ to
settle an issue of liability leaving the measure of damages for trial"
and to serve as a pre-trial order settling certain issues of fact if no
judgment on all the issues can be made.'" It may be initiated by a
claimant after the twenty-day period following the commencement
of the action, or upon service of a motion for summary judgment by
the adverse party,"- who may move for summary judgment at any
time.' 2 A judgment is appealable if it disposes 3of a whole claim but
an order denying judgment is not appealable.'
No case is ripe for summary judgment unless there is no "genuine issue as to any material fact."' 4 Both parties should be armed
with affidavits as to the facts at the hearing on the motion, for the
'
movant has the burden of showing there is no issue of fact," and
3. See Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Cizil Procedure,
38 Yale L. J. 193 (1928).
4. Id. at 213.
5. 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1231-1247
(1950) ; 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 56 (1938) ; 3A Ohlinger, Federal Practice 297 (1948) ; 10 Cycyopedia of Federal Procedure 175 (3d ed. 1952) ;
Clark, Summary Judgments, 2 F. R. D. 364 (1943); Clark and Samenow,
supra note 1; Shientag, Summary Judgment. 4 Ford L. Rev. 186 (1935)
(New York experience).
6. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 (1952) ; Johnston-Crews Co. v. United States,
38 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. S.C. 1941).
7. Commercial Credit Corp. v. California Shipbuilding Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 936 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Northland Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated
Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 431 (D. Minn. 1946).
8. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (1952).
9. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1952).
10. See Note of Advisory Committee on Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d).
11. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 (1952). See Krug v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R..
158 F. 2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1946), decided before amendment, where plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment was stricken as premature, since defendant had
filed no answer yet had moved for summary judgment.
12. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.02 (1952); Gifford v. Travelers Protective
Ass'n, 153 F. 2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946).
13. Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F. 2d 123 (5th Cir.
1939). See Clark v. Taylor, 163 F. 2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947).
14. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1952).
15. Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. R., 135 F. 2d 101 (8th Cir. 1943);
3 Moore, Federal Practice § 56.08 (1938).
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the adverse party may have judgment entered against him if he
offers no evidence raising a dispute as to the facts.16 The court may
consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits in
17
deciding whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact.
What constitutes a genuine issue of material fact is apt to be
most perplexing. A strictly logical answer may not be controlling
in all cases, but rather the tendency might be to restrict summary
judgment to those situations that have been historically regarded
as appropriate for summary judgment.'5 Vhile not discouraging
the use of this remedy, the Supreme Court has clearly taken the
position that possible disputable issues must be tried.1" A leading
2' 0
case in the federal courts of appeal, Arnstein v. Porter,
ruled that
a trial was required unless "it could be shown beyond possible question that there was no dispute as to the facts." On the other hand,
it has been observed that ostensible issues on the face of the pleadings
are to be expected,21 and that summary judgment is designed to cut
through sham defenses. 22 Early experimentations with this remedy
were limited to promissory notes and liquidated claims, since sham
defenses were common in these types of cases. 2 3 Other types of cases

have been found not suitable for summary judgment, e.g., suits
against the administrator of a decendent's estate 4 and garnishment proceedings.2 5 Therefore, to determine whether any type of
case is more appropriate for the remedy, and thereby whether no
genuine issue as to material facts is more likely to be found in any
type of case, the appended study was made of the Third and Fourth
Divisions of the Minnesota Federal District Court for the years
1948-1949.
Because of the paucity of instances of the use of summary judgment during that period, a few definite conclusions can be drawn.
16. See Rotberg v. Dodwell & Co., 152 F. 2d 100 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Engl

v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F. 2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
17. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (1952).

18. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464, 474 (2d Cir. 1946) ; see also
Judge Clark's dissent, id. at 479.
19. Lillie v. Tompson, 332 U. S. 459 (1947) ; Sartor v. Arkansas Nat.
Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620 (1944). Both cases reversed an affirmance by a
court of appeals of summary judgment in the trial court.
20. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
21. 3 Moore, Federal Procedure § 56.04 (1938). See Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F. 2d 464, 475 (1946) (dissent by Clark, J.). Note, 55 Yale L. J. 810
(1946).
22. See the Preamble to 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (1855), reprinted in Clark
and Samenow, supra note 1.
23. See Clark and Samenow, supra note 1.
24. Caswell v. Stearns, 257 Mich. 461, 241 N. W. 165 (1932).
25. Hoffman v. Professional Under-writers, 256 Mich. 622, 239 N. Mr.
295 (1932).
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The most significant aspect of the study is the almost complete
absence of employment of summary judgment in personal injury
and death actions. Though this tends to support a conclusion that
summary judgment is inappropriate in such cases, it could be
explained by the possibility that (1) this remedy's full value has
not been realized, for there is zunple precedent elsewhere for the use
of summary judgment in such cases, 2 6 and, (2) the uncrowded condition of the calendar would give rise to no need for a prompt decision. The remedy was not sought in any of the 66 cases that concerned promissory notes and suits on judgment, although 53 per
cent of these cases went by default. Since this type of case was the
first to which summary judgments were applied, the total absence
of the use of this remedy may mean that ordinary trial procedures
are adequate to cope with sham defenses when the delay of a crowded
calendar is lacking. Federal housing matters, most frequent in the
use of summary judgment, might be analagous to the summary procedure in unlawful detainer action in municipal and justice courts,
except that the Rules do not apply to these courts..2 7 The incidence
of use in contract and insurance cases, 3.4 per cent, allows no definite conclusion in comparison to other types of cases.
Historically the summary judgment appears to have been resorted to as a means of clearing up crowded court calendars.- ' Because the Minnesota Federal District Court is not far behind on
its calendar, any comparison to state district courts that are overcrowded may be unwarranted. Aside from the valuable objective of
cutting through sham defenses, the summary judgment has great
value in that it reduces the costs of preparation for trial. This objective has application even where court calendars are not crowded. The
study shows that summary judgments are not used frequently in
the Federal Court and that the uses to which it is put there bear
little analogy to Minnesota practice. The appropriateness of summary judgment to a particular type of case cannot be predicted by
reference to experience of the Minnesota Federal District Court.
An uncrowded court calendar has probably prevented fullest exploitation of this remedy. Hcwever, summary judgments in Minnesota practice will probably not meet a similar fate.
26. E.g., King v. United States, 178 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U. S.964 (1950) ; Thomas v. Furness, Ltd., 171 F. 2d 434 (9th
Cir. 1948), cert denied, 337 U. S. 960 (1949) ; Seward v. Nissen, 2 F. R. D.
545 (D. Del. 1942).
27. Minn. R. Civ. P. 1 (1952).

28. See Clark and Samenow, supra note 1.

NOTE
USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE MINNESOTA FEDERAL DIsTRIcT
COURT DuING 1948-1949"

Type of Case

Div. 3

Div. 4

Personal Injury, Death
Actions, FELA and
Fed. Tort Claims ................ 134
158
Other Tort .......
.......
6
20
Contract and Insurance
Matters ...............49**
101
Housing and Price Control .. 23
100
Promissory Notes and Suits
on Judgments ......................
11
55
Condemnation (mostly under
Food & Drug Act) ........... 19
38
Commerce Matters ..............

22

Patent, Trade Mark and
Copyright .............. 3**
Taxation .............
....
9
Labor Relations and FLSA.. 11
Anti-Trust and Restraint
of Trade ...........................
0
Other

Total, .

_..................

...........

.....

Motions
for
Total Suninary Motions
Cases Judgment Granted

292
26

1
3

0
1

150
123

8
13

2
7

66

0

0

57

0

0

19

41

0

0

24
11
5

27
20
16

2
1
1

1
0
0

9

9
18
845

0

0

7

11

...... 294

551

0

0

29

11

*All cases initiated during the years 1948-1949 were used regardless of the
d;sposition. It was assumed that the docket was correct on its face unless
mistake was obvious.
**Two cases had more than one major issue, and were placed in both categories.

